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I. — INTRODUCTION
The appeal of evolutionary game theory to social scientists in general and
economists in particular rests on the fact that it allows to investigate the dyna-
mics and long-run properties of a population of interacting boundedly rational
players. Methods borrowed from biology have helped to adresse questions of
equilibrium selection and stability as documented in several monographs : van
Damme (1991), Weibull (1995), Vega-Redondo (1996), Samuelson (1997). In
the young tradition of Blume (1993, 1995), Berninghaus and Schwalbe
(1996a,b), Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), abbreviated KMR in the sequel,
Ellison (1993), Rhode and Stegeman (1996), Young (1998, Ch. 6), and Baron
et al. (2002a,b), we consider best response dynamics where at each time, one
or every player plays a (static) best response against the empirical distribution
of the last strategies played by his neighbors. This constitutes rational behavior
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impaired by myopia. Myopia in the temporal sense means that the player is not
forward looking, does not take into account that other players might be chan-
ging their strategies. This trait is shared, for example, by naive Bayesian lear-
ners [Eichberger et al. (1993)]. Myopia in the spatial sense, if applicable,
means that the player is influenced only by his local environment.
In the sequel, an « interaction structure » is modelled as an undirected finite
graph whose vertices or nodes are the members of the player population. Two
players are neighbors, if they form an edge of the graph. We assume that the
graph and a fortiori the interaction structure is regular, i.e. all players have the
same number of neighbors. We finally assume that direct interaction is only
possible between neighbors. We are going to analyze local as well as global
interaction in population games, using the formalism of neural networks. More
specifically, we put forward a modelling approach to best response dynamics
that (a) allows for rather general interaction structures ; (b) exhibits spatial pat-
terns of play ; (c) exhibits non-uniform noise ; (d) links stochastic and deter-
ministic dynamics ; (e) involves asynchronous updating ; (f) encompasses
majority imitation.
Blume (1995) studies and compares local and global interaction for specific
interaction structures (infinite and finite two-dimensional lattices). In an other-
wise deterministic model, Blume assumes asynchronous updating where each
period, a player is selected at random and plays a myopic best response against
his neighbors’ previous actions. Berninghaus and Schwalbe (1996a,b), in a
model with simultaneous updating, were the first to demonstrate that the theo-
ry of neural networks can be successfully applied to analyze deterministic best
response dynamics with global or local interaction. Here we go beyond Blume
(1995) and Berninghaus and Schwalbe (1996a,b) and introduce noise, random
non-best responses to be precise, into the system. This has been done before,
notably by Blume (1993) who pioneered the use of statistical mechanics
methods for population games on infinite lattices. KMR and Ellison allow for
noise in what they call « best reply » and other dynamiques (1). We use a
« Boltzmann machine », a particular kind of stochastic neural network, to
model noise. The noise operates on the thresholds of the threshold automata
(neurons) constituting the network. This produces two major innovations.
First, a state of the system describes a spatial pattern of play, not merely a sum-
mary statistics as in KMR and Ellison. Second, the probability of a « flip », i.e.
of non-best-response play is a continuous and decreasing function of the
payoff loss caused by the flip whereas in KMR and Ellison the probability is
independent of state and player.
(1) See also the comment on KMR by Rhode and Stegeman (1996). See further Foster and
Young (1990), Young and Foster (1991), Fudenberg and Harris (1992), Young (1993), and
Binmore et al. (1995). Our approach, while independently conceived and developed, is
closely related to Chapter 6 of Young (1998).
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Running the « Boltzmann machine », we obtain an explicit formula for the
stochastic steady state (invariant distribution) in terms of the parameters of the
model for any regular interaction structure. In fact, we obtain an invariant dis-
tribution of the Gibbs-Boltzmann type (2). We are able to relate the long-run
equilibria à la KMR (introduced as stochastically stable states in Foster and
Young (1990)) to the deterministic steady states. We can, in principle, compu-
te all long-run equilibria for any symmetric 2 × 2 game and any regular inter-
action structure, by solving a discrete optimization problem without resorting
to a root counting procedure. We not only determine how often a strategy
occurs, but also detect the spatial pattern of play in a long-run equilibrium. The
explicit determination of long-run equilibria in Haller and Outkin (1999)
shows that by and large, the properties of long-run equilibria reported by KMR
and Ellison are confirmed – which implies a certain robustness of the model.
Notice, however, that Rhode and Stegeman have amended and corrected some
of the KMR results, ending up with a richer taxonomy of games. Notice fur-
ther that according to Bergin and Lipman (1996), different types of noise can
give rise to different sets of long-run equilibria. Baron et al. (2002a) provide
an explicit example that yields different long-run equilibria in our model and
in a model with Bernoulli or uniform trembles.
The distinction between global and local interaction is only interesting, if it
makes a difference. Apart from purely descriptive reasons, the comparison of
interaction structures has been motivated by the pioneering work of Novak and
May (1993) whose simulations of deterministic best performance imitation
have generated significant differences across interaction structures. The theo-
retical analysis of deterministic best response dynamics by Berninghaus and
Schwalbe (1996b) shows that the size and shape of neighborhoods can affect
the nature, number, stability, and attractiveness of limit cycles and steady
states. Also notice L. Blume’s lucid comment on the impact of the interaction
structure on the rate of convergence [Blume (1995, p. 130)]. In the case of dif-
ferentiation or anti-coordination games (games with no symmetric pure strate-
gy equilibrium), our analysis of stochastic best response dynamics with asyn-
chronous updating demonstrates a significant difference of long-run equilibria
across interaction structures, an important new discovery : With an even num-
ber of players and a circular graph, in each long-run equilibrium, the two
actions of the constituent game are alternating along the graph ; hence the ratio
of their frequencies is 50:50. In a global inter-action game, the ratio approxi-
mately equals the ratio of the probabilities in a mixed equilibrium strategy of
the constituent game and can be quite different from 1.
Careful inspection reveals a close relation between our analysis and Chapter
6 of Young (1998). More generally, we establish a link between the neural net-
(2) This kind of distribution has been derived or postulated before; see in particular Blume
(1997) and Young (1998). Baron et al. (2000a,b) extend the analysis to the case of non-
binary choices, among other variations.
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work approach and the stochastic discrete choice approach. In the specific case
at hand, we show that if the thresholds of the neural network are perturbed by
logistic noise, then state transitions of the system are governed by the log-
linear response rule (6.3) of Young (1998). The neural network approach leads
to a convenient explicit formula for a potential of the « spatial game ». This
finding allows us to determine long-run equilibria without resorting to the
more cumbersome tree counting method introduced into game theory by
Foster and Young (1990).
Applications in Industrial Economics : The model lends itself to the study of
various coordination problems in industrial economics, for exemple the choi-
ce of industry standards and norms. In Section 8, we elaborate on a specific
application, a model of formation of user networks.
In the next three sections, we redesign and augment the basic deterministic
model of Berninghaus and Schwalbe (1996b). We proceed to the more elabo-
rate stochastic model in Section 5. Section 6 is a digression on invariant Gibbs-
Boltzmann distributions. Section 7 specializes, introducing logistic noise into
the model which gives rise to a log-linear response model and invariant Gibbs-
Boltzmann distributions. Section 9 concludes.
II. — NETWORKED MODELS
In the sequel we consider dynamics that can be represented by means of neu-
ral networks, a special case of automata networks. The use of automata net-
works is quite common in computer science. For instance, the interaction
within a computer network falls into this category. Parallel processing is an-
other example. The approach also suggests itself for decentralized models of
robots interacting in a production process. Maes (1989) aims at « the building
of an intelligent system as a society of interacting mindless agents, each
having their own specific competence ». Similarly, in the area of industrial
organization, automata networks appear well suited for the description of
information flows between units or divisions of an organization (firm, indus-
try). For extensive reading on automata networks, see Coughlin and Baran
(1995), Goles and Martinez (1990, 1992), Haykin (1994). We commence with
a few formal definitions, first of an Automata Network (AN) and then of a
Neural Network (NN). Throughout, I = {1, … , N } with N ≥ 2 is a non-empty
finite set. Let us denote J≡ {J ⊆ I : |J| = 2}, the set of two-member subsets of I.
An Automata Network on I is a triple A = (G, Σ, ( fi, i ∈ I)) where :
G = (I, V ) is a (undirected) graph.
Σ is the set of states of any vertex of the graph G.
fi is the transition function associated with the vertex i ∈ I.
First, the graph G = (I, V ) comprises I, its set of vertices (points, nodes), and
V ⊆ J, the set of edges (arcs, links) of the graph. I will be interpreted as the
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player population. I can also be interpreted at a set of locations where each
location i is occupied by exactly one player whom we conveniently label i as
well. We interpret G or simply V as « interaction structure ». Namely, given
the player population I, the edges of the graph define the opportunities for
direct interaction. If i, j ∈ I and i ≠ j, we interpret {i, j} ∈ V as i and j being
adjacent or neighbors. A player i ∈ I directly interacts with and only with
players in his neighborhood Vi = { j ∈ I : {i, j} ∈ V} (3). We assume the inter-
action structure to be regular, i.e. there is a number n ∈ IN with |Vi| = n for all
i ∈ I, and to be connected. Second, for every vertex i ∈ I, the set Σ represents
the potential states of vertex i – or of the player located at vertex i. A state of
vertex or player i is denoted by si. In our context, si is a strategy played by
player i. Third, to each vertex or player i, we associate the transition function
fi : ΣVi→ Σ. This means that the current strategic choices of his neighbors deter-
mine a player’s next strategic choice. The evolution in discrete time t of the
global state s(t) ∈ ΣI is governed by the global transition function F : ΣI → ΣI
obtained as composition of all the local ones : F(s) = ( fi((sj)j∈Vi))i∈I for s = (s1,
… , sN) ∈ ΣI. Each fi is also called a (memory-less) automaton.
Every stationary population game dynamics with finite strategy sets and fini-
te neighborhoods corresponds to an automata network. This by itself does not
allow strong conclusions. To arrive at interesting results, more structure has to
be imposed. For our purposes, the more restrictive structure of a neural net-
work is imposed :
A Neural Network (Threshold Automata Network) is a particular type of
automata network. Its individual state space is binary. Here we assume for
convenience that Σ = {0, 1}. The network’s transition function and, implicitly,
its graph are based on a weight structure, given by a symmetric N×N-matrix
W = (wij). Namely : every arc (i, j) ∈ V is assigned a real number wij ∈ IR which
represents its weight. If i and j are not neighbors, we put wij = 0. The transi-
tion function takes on the following form:
si(t + 1) = L (∑j∈Vi wijsj(t) – bi) (1)
where bi is a threshold and the function L(⋅) is given by L(x) = 0 if x ≤ 0 and
L(x) = 1 if x > 0. An automaton described by (1) is called a neuron or threshold
automaton.
As the term suggests, neural networks can be used to model the interaction
between brain or nerve cells : If and only if a receptor-transmitter receives a
strong enough stimulus, it will emit a signal of its own. In a similar vein, in a
social environment, an individual’s decision to be violent or not may depend
on the amount of violence in the neighborhood. Our current interest in neural
(3) Notice that by definition, i ∉ Vi which is the prevalent convention in graph theory. See for
instance Chartrand (1985). The convention i ∈ Vi coexists.
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networks stems from the fact that simple best response dynamics, among
others, can be described in terms of a neural network.
III. — DETERMINISTIC BEST RESPONSE MODELS
Consider a symmetric two person game :
0 1
0 a,a b,c (2)
1 c,b d,d
Like Berninghaus and Schwalbe (1996b), we are going to represent the best
response dynamics of an associated population game as an NN. The player
population is I, endowed with an interaction structure V. We shall assume that
all players have the same number of neighbors n ≥ 1: |Vi | = n for all i ∈ I. In
other words, the interaction structure (graph) is n-regular. We further assume
that only pure strategies are played. The set of pure strategies available to each
player is Σ = {0, 1}, and the state space of the entire system is ΣI = {0, 1}I. A
state records the action taken by each of the players.
3.1. Nash Configurations
Let us first consider the static spatial game associated with the interaction
structure V and introduce the concept of Nash configuration. Player i ∈ I
directly interacts only with his neighbors and has information only about the
strategies played in his neighborhood, Vi. For a state s = (s1 , … , sN) and a
player i ∈ I, let s
–i = (sk)k∈Vi denote the profile of strategies played in Vi. Let
pii(si, s–i) denote the aggregate payoff to player i from playing strategy si once
against each neighbor, if s
–i is the profile of strategies played in his neighbo-
rhood. The static spatial game assumes the normal form
Γ = (I, (Si)i∈I, (νi)i∈I)
where Si = Σ for all i ∈ I and νi(s) = pii(si, s–i) for all i ∈ I and s = (s1, … , sN)
∈ S ≡ S1 ×… × SN = ΣI. Obviously, global states and strategy profiles for Γ are
the same. Following Blume (1993, 1995), the Nash equilibria in pure strate-
gies of Γ will be called Nash configurations.
3.2. A Potential
A potential of the spatial game is a function H : S → IR such that if i ∈ I and
s, s′ ∈ S differ only in the i’th component, then
νi(s) – νi(s′) = H(s) – H(s′). (3)
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In the sequel, we denote the differences in (3) by ∆νi and ∆H, respectively.
Young (1998, Ch. 6) demonstrates that the spatial game has a potential. Here
we derive an explicit formula for a potential that will prove very useful later
on. To this end, let us determine ∆νi for some player i ∈ I. Given a profile s–i
of strategies played in Vi, let zi equal the number of players using strategy 1 in
Vi and n – zi equal the number of players using strategy 0 in Vi. Then i’s aggre-
gate payoffs are
pii(0, s–i ) = (n – zi)a + zib;
pii(1, s–i ) = (n – zi)c + zid.
Hence the payoff difference ∆pii = pii(1, s–i (t)) – pii(0, s–i (t)) satisfies
∆pii = zi(a – c + d – b) + n(c – a)
= ∑
j∈Vi
(a – c + d – b)sj – n(a – c) (4)
= w ∑
j∈Vi
sj – nβ
where β = a – c and w = a – c + d – b. Now define H : S → IR by
H(s) = ∑
k∈I
sk [ 1—2  w ∑j∈Vk sj – nβ ]. (5)
Next consider two states s, s′ ∈ S which differ only in the i’th coordinate.
Without loss of generality, assume si = 1 and s′i = 0. Then
H(s) – H(s′) = w ∑
j∈Vi
sj – nβ
whereas by (4), νi(s) – νi(s′) = ∆pii = w ∑
j∈Vi
sj – nβ. Thus we have shown :
Proposition 1 - The function H defined by (5) is a potential function for the
spatial game.
IV. — DETERMINISTIC NEURAL NETWORK DYNAMICS
AND CONTAGION
Now we model the dynamics of myopic best-response play in terms of a neu-
ral network. Let si(t) denote the strategy played by player i in period t = 0,
1, … . Contagion (with respect to action 1) occurs from an initial subset I0 of
I, if si(0) = 1 for i ∈ I0, si(0) = 0 for i ∉ I0, and there exists T ∈ IN such that si(t)
= 1 for all i ∈ I and t ≥ T. We say that contagion is optimal, if contagion does
not occur from any proper subset I′0 of I0. We call contagion monotone if si(t
+ 1) ≥ si(t) for all i and t.
Again, player i ∈ I directly interacts only with his neighbors and has infor-
mation only about the strategies played in his neighborhood, Vi. We assume
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that a player (when he has a choice) employs a myopic best response, i.e. the
strategy he chooses for the period t + 1 is a best response against the empiri-
cal distribution of strategies played in his neighborhood at time t. One can
find a discussion of validity of the myopia assumption in KMR and Ellison
(1993).
We denote by s
–i(t) the profile of strategies played in Vi at time t and by pii(si,
s
–i(t)) the aggregate payoff to player i at time t from playing strategy si once
against each neighbor. This means that all neighbors are equally important.
Alternatively, one could work with average payoffs.
Because of (4), the decision rule for a population of best response players
can be written in a threshold form :
si(t + 1) = L [ w ∑j∈Vi sj(t) – nβ ] . (6)
Thus deterministic best response dynamics is modelled as a neural network.
4.1. Simultaneous or Synchronous Updating
Simultaneous or synchronous updating means that the updating rule (6) is
applied to all i and t. The model has been analyzed in depth by Berninghaus
and Schwalbe (1996b) who follow the logic of Goles and Martinez (1990) and
find, using a potential like (5), that with simultaneous updating the only cycles
are fixed points (steady states) and two-cycles. Their analysis also shows that
both the size and shape of neighborhoods can affect the nature, number, stabi-
lity, and attractiveness of limit cycles and steady states. Durieu et al. (2005)
investigate and characterize contagion for the dynamical system with simulta-
neous updating when w ≥ β ≥ 0. In view of the result of Goles and Martinez,
there are three possibilities : (a) contagion ; (b) convergence to a fixed point
without contagion ; (c) convergence to a two-cycle. The analysis of Durieu et
al. (2005) indicates that, as a rule, there is no fast way to verify (a), whereas
there exists several fast routines (easy-to-check necessary conditions) to rule
out (a).
Clearly, contagion cannot occur if the constituent bi-matrix game is a diffe-
rentiation or anti-coordination game. These are the « games with no symme-
tric pure strategy equilibrium » where it is in both players’ interest to choose
strategies different from each other. Examples are fashion games among non-
conformists and hawk-dove games. These games are characterized by a – c < 0
and d – b < 0, hence w < β < 0. Obviously, contagion cannot occur either if 0
is a strictly dominant strategy of the constituent bi-matrix game, like in a
Prisoner’s Dilemma game, which amounts to a – c > 0 and d – b < 0. In the
opposite case, when a – c < 0 and d – b > 0 and 1 is the strictly dominant stra-
tegy, contagion does occur. In the case of coordination games, where a – c > 0
and d – b > 0, the outcome depends on the interaction structure, I0, and which
action is risk dominant. Consider for example N ≥ 2, V the circular graph given
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by Vi = {j ∈ I |j = i ± 1modulo N} for i ∈ I, and I0 = {k} for some k ∈ I. If
action 0 is risk dominant – which is the case if a – c > d – b > 0 – then in one
step, convergence to the fixed point where all play 0 occurs. If N is even and
action 1 is risk dominant – which is the case if d – b > a – c > 0 – the conver-
gence to a two-cycle occurs. If N is odd and action 1 is risk dominant, then
optimal contagion occurs.
We further observe that larger neighborhoods (larger interaction windows)
and, hence, more connectivity may but need not favor contagion.
4.2. Asynchronous Updating
Asynchronous updating means that at any time only one player will be upda-
ting his state. This is modelled by means of a sequence K(t), t = 0, 1, 2, … , of
I-valued random variables. K(t) determines which of the players will have a
chance to alter his strategy at time t. Accordingly, the updating rule (6) is
applied if i = K(t); otherwise, si(t + 1) = si(t).
We assume that the stochastic process K(t); t = 0, 1, … , is recurrent, that is
for each i ∈ I and t ≥ 0, almost certainly the process returns to i after time t :
Prob ({K(t′) = i for some t′ > t}) = 1.
Recurrence is satisfied, for instance, by the periodic deterministic sequence
0, 1, … , N–1, 0, 1, … given by K(t) = t modulo N at one extreme and by a
sequence of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables
with full support I at the other extreme. As an immediate consequence of
Proposition 1, we obtain
Proposition 2 - Under asynchronous updating governed by a recurrent pro-
cess K(t), t = 0, 1, … , convergence to a Nash configuration of Γ occurs with
probability 1.
Like with simultaneous updating, contagion cannot occur if the constituent
bi-matrix game is an anti-coordination game or if 0 is a strictly dominant stra-
tegy. In case that 1 is the strictly dominant strategy, contagion does occur with
probability 1. In the case of coordination games, consider again the example
N ≥ 2, V the circular graph given by Vi = {j ∈ I |j = i ± 1 modulo N} for i ∈ I,
and I0 = {k} for some k ∈ I. Moreover, assume that the random variables K(t)
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with Prob({K(0) = i}) = 1/N
for all i ∈ I. If action 0 is risk dominant then with probability 1, there is conver-
gence to the Nash configuration where all play 0. If action 1 is risk dominant,
then with probability 1/3, convergence to the Nash configuration where all
play 0 occurs and with probability 2/3 contagion occurs. In contrast to simul-
taneous updating, the latter result holds irrespective of the odd- or evenness
of N.
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In the following sections, we shall go beyond Berninghaus and Schwalbe by
adding noise to the basic model.
V. — NOISY BEST RESPONSE DYNAMICS
In many cases it is beneficial to introduce randomness into the model. For
example, deterministic models may have cycles or multiple equilibrium
points. Frequently, under reasonable assumptions, a random Markov process
on the same system has a unique stationary distribution. Also, we know from
computer science that the learning capabilities of a stochastic network can be
substantially better than those of a deterministic one. Whenever applicable, we
keep the previous notation. Again, two polar updating rules are possible : syn-
chronous and asynchronous iteration. In the synchronous or simultaneous
mode we assume that all agents update their strategies at the same time, and in
the asynchronous mode we assume that at any given time only one agent can
update his strategy. We shall adopt the latter assumption in the sequel.
However, we first present a model of synchronous updating to exhibit the dif-
ference.
Synchronous Updating. A model of synchronous updating is described by
(6) with noise added. The noise shifts the thresholds nβ. It is given by a fami-
ly of random variables εi(t), i = 1, … , N; t = 0, 1, 2, … , so that
si(t + 1) = L [ w ∑j∈Vi sj(t) – βn + εi(t) ] (7)
for all i and t. The noise can come from several sources : noise in the level of
the threshold, in the strategy played or perhaps in the payoff parameters ; in
Ellison’s eloquent words, noise in the form of deliberate experimentation,
trembles in strategy choices and the play of new players unfamiliar with the
history of the game. If the noise distribution εi(t) is continuous and has suffi-
ciently large support, (7) means that the probability of a « flip », i.e. of non-
best-response play is a continuous and decreasing function of the payoff loss
caused by the flip whereas in KMR and Ellison the probability is independent
of state and player.
Asynchronous Updating. Our subsequent analysis is based on asynchro-
nous updating, i.e. only one player will be updating his state at a time. We can
express this by means of an updating rule similar, but not identical to (7) : The
updating rule (7) is applied if i = K(t) whereas si(t + 1) = si(t) if i ≠ K(t) where
as before, K(t), t = 0, 1, 2, … , is a sequence of I-valued random variables. K(t)
determines which of the players will have a chance to alter his strategy at
time t. Again, the noise is modelled by means of a family εi(t), i = 1, … , N ; t
= 0, 1, 2, … , of real-valued random variables. We shall proceed under the fol-
lowing further.
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ASSUMPTIONS :
(I) The random variables K(t) are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) with full support I.
(II) The random variables εi(t) are independent (across i and t) and given
any i, identically distributed.
(III) The player-picking process {K(t)} and the noise process {εi(t)} are
independent.
(IV) The event {εi(t) > n ⋅ (|w| + |β |)} has positive probability for each pair
(i, t).
(V) The event {εi(t) < –n ⋅ (|w| + |β |)} has positive probability for each pair
(i, t).
Assumptions (I) – (III) guarantee that the dynamic process with asynchro-
nous updating is a stationary Markov process on ΣI whose transition matrix we
denote by P. A generic entry P(s′|s) of the transition matrix P is the probabili-
ty that the next state is s′, if the current state is s.
Assumptions (IV) and (V) guarantee that « flips » occur with positive pro-
bability regardless of the state of the system. Thus players are payoff-sensiti-
ve even when making mistakes. Consequently, the Markov chain generated by
P is aperiodic and irreducible. Moreover, if the distributions εi(t) are conti-
nuous, then the probability of a « flip », i.e. of non-best-response play is a
continuous and decreasing function of the payoff loss caused by the flip.
Let us represent probability distributions on S by means of |S |-dimensional
probability vectors ρ = (ρ(s))s∈S. If ρt is the distribution of states at some time
t, then the distribution at time t + 1 is given by
ρt +1 = P ⋅ ρt. (8)
A distribution ρ is called an invariant distribution or a stochastic steady
state, if
ρ = P ⋅ ρ. (9)
Now well known results for discrete time Markov processes with finite state
space yield :
Proposition 3 - If (I)-(V) hold, then the Markov chain has a unique invariant
distribution ρ which has full support. Moreover, the distributions ρt defined
recursively by (8) converge in distribution to ρ regardless of the initial distri-
bution of states, ρ0.
Among the classical references for this sort of result are Doob (1953), Feller
(1968), and Loève (1960). Grimmet and Stirzaker (1982) and Seneta (1981)
provide easy access to the material.
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VI. — DIGRESSION ON GIBBS-BOLTZMANN DISTRIBUTIONS
The invariant distribution, i.e. the solution of (9) is an eigenvector of P with
eigenvalue 1. It can be found by means of routine, albeit cumbersome tech-
niques. If, however, P is of a particular form, then the unique invariant distri-
bution assumes the Gibbs-Boltzmann form (12) below whose explicit formu-
la proves quite useful. Most of the literature on Gibbs-Boltzmann distributions
is instructive, but rather sketchy and/or preoccupied with deriving certain pro-
perties from first principles of statistical mechanics. Therefore, we provide a
brief, yet self-contained treatment of our own, following Haykin (1994, sec-
tion 8.12) to some degree.
To begin with, let us assume that the transition process P on the finite state
space S, specifically S = ΣI in our case, can be factored into two steps :
P(s′|s) = r(s′|s) ⋅ q(s′|s) for s ≠ s′ (10)
where r (s′|s) is the probability of an opportunity for a transition from state s to
state s′ and q(s′|s) is the probability of a transition conditional on the event that
an opportunity arises. Further restrictions are :
• Symmetry : r(s′|s) = r(s|s′) for all s ≠ s′
• Normalization : Σs′≠s r(s’|s) = 1
• Complementarity : q(s′|s) + q(s |s′) = 1 for s ≠ s′
The key result is
Proposition 4 - Suppose that :
(a) There is a unique invariant measure ρ that has full support.
(b) There is a function G : ΣI → IR such that
1                               exp(G(s′))
q(s′|s) = ___________________ = ___________________ . (11)
1 + exp(G(s) – G(s′))       exp(G(s)) + exp(G(s′))
Then ρ assumes the Gibbs-Boltzmann form:
exp(G(s))
ρ(s) = ______________ . (12)
Σs′ exp(G(s′))
Proof. Suppose (a), (b) and that ρ is given by (12). Then by (11), a strong
« detailed balance principle » holds :
q(s′|s)ρ(s) = q(s |s′)ρ(s′) for all s ≠ s′. (13)
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As an immediate consequence of (13), (10), and symmetry, we obtain the
usual « detailed balance principle » :
P(s′|s)ρ(s) = P(s |s′)ρ(s′) for all s ≠ s′. (14)
But (14) combined with the fact that P is a stochastic matrix and the norma-
lization condition on the probabilities of opportunity implies (9) : For any s′,
Σs P(s′|s)ρ(s) = Σs P(s |s′)ρ(s′) = ρ(s′) Σs P(s |s′) = ρ(s′), that is (9). By (a), the
assertion follows.
Notice that because of (11), complementarity has been used implicitly in the
proof. Also notice that (14) implies (13), in case r(s′|s) > 0 for all s ≠ s′. The
latter will not be the case in our application. But suppose that it is the case and
that (14) can be assumed on a priori grounds. Then like in the literature, the
order of crucial arguments can be reversed. In particular, (11) does not need to
be assumed any longer, but is rather a consequence. Namely, first (14) implies
(13). But then, by complementarity, (11) holds with G(s) ≡ ln(ρ(s)):
1                                1
q(s′|s) = _____________ = __________________
1 + ρ(s) /ρ(s′)      1 + exp(G(s) – G(s′))
VII. — LOGISTIC NOISE
We now are ready to apply Proposition 4 in the game-theoretic context of
Section 4. Throughout, we assume noisy best response dynamics with asyn-
chronous updating and make the above assumptions (I) – (V). Moreover, we
specialize and assume here that
(VI) each noise variable εi(t) is a logistic random variable with zero mean
and common scaling parameter T, i.e. the cumulative distribution function
(c.d.f.) is given by :
1
Pr[εi(t) ≤ ε] = _____________ , ∀ i, t (15)
1 + exp[–ε /T ]
One can prove :
Proposition 5 - In a population of best response players, with the noise being
distributed according to (15), the invariant distribution of strategies has the
Gibbs-Boltzmann form (12) where G(s) = H(s)/T and H is the potential func-
tion of the spatial game defined by (5).
Proof. Let us verify that the system has the two-step factorization property.
Let s ≠ s′. A direct transition from s to s′ requires that s and s′ differ in exact-
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ly one coordinate, say the i-th. Then an « opportunity » for a transition from s
to s′ arises if and only if it is i’s turn to move. Also, an « opportunity » for a
transition from s′ to s arises if and only if it is i’s turn to move. Thus r(s′|s)
= r(s|s′) = Prob(K(0) = i). In case s and s′ differ in more than one coordinate,
let us set r(s′|s) = r(s |s′) = 0. Suppose that at time t + 1, the current state is s
and player i has the opportunity to change si from 1 to 0, resulting in the new
state s′. This transition only happens if
w ∑
j∈Vi
sj – nβ + εi(t) ≤ 0 or εi(t) ≤ nβ – w ∑
j∈Vi
sj .
The probability of the latter event is
1                                             1
q(s′|s) = _______________________ = ______________________ .
1 + exp[(w Σj∈Vi sj – nβ) /T ]      1 + exp[(H(s) – H(s′)) /T ]
Clearly, complementarity applies : If the current state is s′ and player i has
the opportunity to change s′i from 0 to 1, then the probability of this happening
is q(s |s′) = 1 – q(s′|s) and, therefore,
1
q(s |s′) = _______________________ . (16)
1 + exp[(H(s′) – H(s)) /T ]
Since s and s′ were arbitrary, this covers all relevant contingencies. For the
sake of completeness, we may extend the formula for q(s′|s) to the case where
s and s′ differ in more than one coordinate. By Proposition 4, the assertion fol-
lows.
7.1. The Log-Linear Response Model
Here we uncover the connection between the neural network model with
logistic noise and the log-linear response model. Young (1998, ch. 6) assumes
Pr({K(0) = i}) = 1/N for all i and shows that for the log-linear response model
with parameter 1/T, the invariant distribution is of the form
ρ(s) = exp[R(s)/T] /Σ
s′
exp[R(s′) /T] (17)
where R is a particular potential function of the spatial game. Obviously, R in
(17) can be replaced by any other potential function of the spatial game, for
example H, but by none other than a potential function. Indeed, if R is any
potential function of the spatial game and the noise is logistic with zero mean
and scale parameter T, then (12) holds true for G = R/T. Moreover, the neural
network model then gives rise to the log-linear response model with parameter
1/T, as given by (6.4) in Young (1998). From Proposition 4, we know that (12)
and, hence, (17) holds for arbitrary Pr({K(0) = i}) > 0. The explicit form (5) of
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the potential function H, which we found via the neural network approach,
proves very useful for the determination of long-run equilibria.
Remark. Recent work by Baron et al. (2002a) establishes the Gibbs-
Boltzmann form (12) with G(s) = H(s) /T on the basis of a different set of first
principles : The logit adjustment rule (11) is the solution of a maximization
problem involving a trade-off between the magnitudes of trembles and control
costs. The approach encompasses constituent games with more than two stra-
tegies. Baron et al. (2002b) extend some of the analysis to games which are
not necessarily spatial games or potential games.
7.2. Long-Run Equilibria
The scaling parameter T that is controlling the noise distribution is frequent-
ly interpreted as temperature in a physical context. In a socio-economic
context, one can interpret T as a macroeconomic parameter which determines
the level of exogenous noise at the microeconomic level. This interpretation
presumes that the neural network operates in a larger unspecified economic
environment. A similar interpretation is less compelling for uniform noise
models à la KMR.
In case T → ∞, the c.d.f. (15) becomes flat and half of the mass is moved
towards either tail. The noise becomes the sole driving force of the dynamics.
Accordingly, H(s)/T→ 0 and in the limit, the invariant measure assignes equal
probability to all states. The case T → 0 shifts all the mass towards the mean
of the noise distribution and, thus, constitutes a gradual removal of noise. The
support of the resulting limit distribution ρ* consists of the states s- at which H
is maximized, to which ρ* assigns equal probabilities. The points in the sup-
port (carrier) of ρ* have been called stochastically stable states by Foster and
Young (1990) and long-run equilibria by KMR. It turns out that in general, the
long-run equilibria form a subset of the steady states of the associated deter-
ministic dynamics. For a concise formulation of the result, let us say that there
are ties, if w Σj∈Vi sj–nβ = 0 for some i ∈ I and s ∈ ΣN. In such a case, the argu-
ment of L(⋅) in (6) is 0. Player i is indifferent between si = 0 and si = 1. The
convention L(0) = 0 breaks the tie in favor of si = 0. We say further that H
attains a local maximum at state s, if H(s) ≥ H(s′) for all s′ that differ from s in
only one component.
Proposition 6 - Suppose that there are no ties. Then for any state s-∈ ΣI, pro-
perties (i) and (ii) are equivalent and properties (iii) and (iv) are equivalent.
(i) s- is a long-run equilibrium.
(ii) H(s-) is a maximum of H.
(iii) H(s-) is a local maximum of H.
(iv) s- is a steady state of the deterministic dynamics.
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Remark. Statement (iv) allows for both synchronous and asynchronous
updating. s- is a steady state of the (synchronous or asynchronous) determinis-
tic dynamics, if and only if none of the players wishes to deviate unilaterally
from s- when the opportunity arises. The only difference is that in the synchro-
nous case the opportunity to deviate from s- occurs, with certainty, for all
players simultaneously whereas in the asynchronous case an opportunity to
deviate from s- occurs with positive probability for each of the players. As
observed in Section 4, the coincidence of steady states does not mean that the
dynamics are identical. With or without ties, the property that nobody wants to
deviate unilaterally defines a Nash configuration in the sense of Blume (1993,
1995).
Proof. The equivalence of (i) and (ii) has already been established. s- is a
steady state of the (synchronous or asynchronous) deterministic dynamics, if
and only if none of the players wishes to deviate unilaterally from s- when the
opportunity arises. If there are no ties, this is equivalent to s- being a Nash
configuration. Since H is a potential function of the spatial game, the latter is
equivalent to H attaining a local maximum at s-. It follows that the conditions
for a local maximum and a steady state coincide. This shows the equivalence
of (iii) and (iv).
Corollary 1 - Suppose that there are no ties. Then each long-run equilibrium
is a steady state of the associated deterministic dynamics.
Corollary 2 - There exists a deterministic steady state.
If there are ties, then not every local maximum of H is a deterministic stea-
dy state. Namely, the condition L(0) = 0 breaks ties in favor of 0. It therefore
can happen that a transition from si = 1 to si = 0 does not affect the value of H.
We can conclude, however, that every long-run equilibrium is a Nash confi-
guration and a deterministic steady state with respect to some, possibly perso-
nalized, tie-breaking rule. Notice that the choice of tie-breaking rule has no
impact on the stochastic dynamics, since there ties are zero probability events.
Connectivity of the interaction structure is not required for our results.
Suppose for example that N is even, N = 2Z for some large Z. Then a 1-regu-
lar interaction structure consists of Z pairs of players with interaction only
within each pair. The long-run behavior of the system is the same as if we had
tracked each pairwise interaction separately. Hence in a sense, it is a matter of
convenience whether one studies the population game with 2Z players or Z
population games with 2 players each. However, there is a short-run differen-
ce between the two models. The two dynamic processes progress at different
speeds. Namely, for any pair {i, j} ∈ V, the chance that i or j is picked as the
next mover from the entire population is less than one – in fact much less than
that for most pairs. In contrast, in the 2-player population game with popula-
tion {i, j}, one of them is picked with certainty. Hence Z parallel 2-player
population games tend to move faster than the corresponding 2Z-player popu-
lation game.
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7.3. Long-Run Equilibria and Contagion
Haller and Outkin (1999) and Baron et al. (2000a) determine the long-run
equilibria for various games and interaction structures. In particular, if the
constituent bi-matrix game is a coordination game and has a risk dominant
equilibrium (r, r), then the stochastic best-reply dynamics has a unique long-
run equilibrium where all players choose action r. Now suppose that r = 1 is
the risk dominant strategy. Does this mean that contagion occurs? Not exact-
ly. For the long-run equilibrium is the state in which the system stays most of
the time (but not necessarily all the time) when very little, but still some noise
remains. Therefore, very likely contagion occurs. But whenever contagion has
occurred, there is a small chance that at some point a deviation happens, then
very likely contagion occurs again, etc.
VIII. — INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS: NETWORK FORMATION
Network formation can be analyzed within our formal setting or modifica-
tions thereof. Network formation means either creation of a graph (network)
or formation of user networks. The first case, creation of a graph (network) is
considered in Baron et al. (2006). In the second case, each user has to adopt
one of a finite number of technologies or network goods, for instance compu-
ter systems, word processors, or internet providers, and the adopters of the
same good constitute a user network. The community of Linux users is a spe-
cific example, where each user has to choose from among several partially
compatible « distribution packages » : Debian, Fedora Core, Gentoo Linux,
Knoppix, Mandriva, Slackware Linux, SUSE Linux, Ubuntu, etc. The indivi-
dual choices give rise to separate sub-communities or networks of Debian
users, Ubuntu users, and so on. With perfect incompatibility of technologies
and identical users, the value of such a network is merely a function of its size,
that is the number of its users. Kandori and Rob (1998) allow for the more rea-
listic case of partial compatibility so that the value of a network is affected not
only by its size. Otherwise, their evolutionary model is cast in the framework
of population and spatial games and takes the « uniform error » approach like
KMR and Ellison (1993).
Using the « logit error » approach, Baron et al. (2000b) also examine a
model of user network formation. They find, among other things, that all long-
run equilibria can be asymmetric (different technology choices by different
people) even though the game has symmetric equilibria. In that case, occur-
rence of contagion is rather unlikely.
In principle, a little bit of persistent noise – the premise underlying the
concept of long-run equilibrium – can break up path dependence and over-
come lock-ins in technology choice. It suffices that the perturbed dynamical
system is an irreducible Markov process with finite state space. Irreducibility
means that the system passes in finitely many steps from any given state to any
other state, with positive, perhaps very small probability. Almost certainly
222 REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n° 114 e t  115, 2ème e t  3ème t rimes t res  2006
such a system will not remain in an inferior state forever nor will it stay in any
other state. Rather it tends to visit every state from time to time. But some
states may be visited much more frequently than others. While the system no
longer gets locked into a particular state in a deterministic sense, it may be
hooked to certain states, in a statistical sense. These are the stochastically
stable states or long-run equilibria. Stochastic evolution (persistent noise)
overcomes path dependence and dependence on initial conditions. But the run-
long equilibria, the states where the system resides most of the time, can be
inferior states. For instance, suppose the choice is between two partially com-
patible technologies, 0 and 1, represented by a coordination game with a = 5,
c = 4, d = 3, b = 1. Then coordination on action 0 is payoff dominant whereas
coordination on action 1 is risk dominant, and, therefore, constitutes the long-
run equilibrium behavior.
IX. — CONCLUSION
The paper demonstrates both the power and the limitations of neural network
theory when applied to best response dynamics. Propositions 4 and 5 hold for
any regular interaction structure. A potential shortcoming shared with some of
the most prominent alternative approaches, e.g. KMR’s, is that the neural net-
work theory applied here seems to require that each player makes binary
choices. This theory also seems to require asynchronous updating (4). The
homogeneity of the population assumed in the paper and the literature is
convenient, but of limited appeal in socioeconomic contextes and, perhaps, not
absolutely necessary. Conceivably each pair of player might have a pair-spe-
cific symmetric payoff matrix. Neighborhood membership can be fuzzy like in
Young (1998, ch. 6) and Baron et al. (2000a) – which would allow to distin-
guish between strong and weak links, near and distant neighbors.
There are several, more or less related literatures we have barely touched
upon. The potential fruitfulness of statistical mechanics approaches to socio-
economic interaction has been demonstrated further by Föllmer (1974), Blume
(1997), Durlauf (1993, 1997), among others. Automata have been used before
for different game-theoretical modelling purposes : A small strand of literatu-
re, pioneered by Neyman (1985) and Rubinstein (1986) has used finite auto-
mata to model the complexity of strategies and bounded rationality in repea-
ted games. Finally, instead of being rational, a player can follow other prin-
ciples. Imitation is but one possibility. Imitation among humans is the premi-
se underlying social learning theory [Bandura (1977)]. Define the « reference
group » of a player as his neighborhood plus himself. Then imitation broadly
defined means that tomorrow the player plays one of the strategies played in
his reference group today. Following a rôle model is a very special case of imi-
(4) With respect to simulations, Huberman and Glance (1993) suggest that the order (syn-
chronous versus asynchronous) of updating matters. See also Blume (1995).
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tation. Berninghaus and Schwalbe have observed that majority imitation (fol-
lowing the majority in the reference group) can be modelled by means of neu-
ral networks. In contrast, best performance imitation cannot be modelled by
means of neural networks. Best performance imitation, akin to fitness criteria
in biology, has been studied by, among others, Nowak and May (1993) who
find through simulation of Prisoner’s Dilemma games that local interactions
are dramatically different from global ones. Notice, however, the caveat by
Huberman and Glance (1993) that the differences might disappear if simula-
tions adhered to asynchronous rater than simultaneous updating. Subsequent
theoretical analysis has been performed by Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked
(1998), Kirchkamp (2000), and Outkin (2003). 
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